Beyond the Sanctions: Long-Time Diplomat and Personal Luxury Car Buyer for Kim Jong Un Defects

Summary

The Sourth Korea media "Channle A" introduces the defection story and current activities in South Korea of Kim Chol-song, a former North Korean diplomat who was tasked with importing Kim Jong-un's exclusive luxury cars. While serving as the Deputy Representative for Economic Affairs in St. Petersburg, Russia, he realized the imminent threat of North Korea's guilt-by-association system—even for the elite—after his relative was punished for distributing Bibles. To protect the future and freedom of his then 11-year-old son, he fully utilized his diplomatic privileges and personal connections to successfully seek asylum in South Korea with his family in an exceptionally fast timeframe of just two days. Currently in South Korea, he is dedicating his efforts to improving North Korean human rights issues and rescuing North Korean soldiers mobilized in the Russia-Ukraine war.

Profile and Activities of the Guest

• Name: Mr. Kim Chol-song (김철성)
• Period: He was stationed abroad from 2007 to 2016.
• Location: St. Petersburg, Russia.
• Activities:
  • He served as the Deputy Representative of the Economic and Trade Counselor's Office in St. Petersburg, representing the North Korean Ministry of External Economic Relations.
  • He managed North Korean foreign currency-earning enterprises and construction workers dispatched to Russia, and held the authority to approve or deny North Korean businesses trying to enter the Russian market.
  • He acted as a highly trusted "personal shopper" for Kim Jong-un, directly importing luxury foreign vehicles (like Mercedes-Benz) and personal items exclusively for the Kim family.
  • On a personal business level, he imported Russian Baltika beer into North Korea to meet his foreign currency-earning quotas.

Items Transported to North Korea and Smuggling Methods

• Items Transported: He imported a total of nine luxury vehicles, including Mercedes-Benz cars, and buses for Kim Jong-un and his bodyguards. He also transported small daily necessities, such as soap boxes and combs used by the Kim family.
• Methods:
  • Using Foreign Intermediaries: Because of international sanctions, he could not purchase these items legally. He used foreign nationals (from China, Singapore, the Netherlands, etc.) and their bank accounts to buy the cars and transfer funds.
  • Route Laundering: To avoid tracking, the cars were repeatedly bought and sold among foreigners and moved through multiple countries, acting like money laundering. For example, a car might go from the Netherlands to the UK, Singapore, Macau, Japan, Busan (South Korea), and finally Vladivostok (Russia).
  • Delivery into North Korea: From Vladivostok, the vehicles were airlifted directly to Pyongyang using transport planes. Alternatively, vehicles were driven to Dandong, China, where North Korean guards would take over and drive them into North Korea using "Route 123," an exclusive road for the Kim family.
  • Evading Inspections: To ensure utmost secrecy, smaller personal items for the Kim family were handed over in person in places like Dandong, specifically avoiding any X-ray security checks.

Companies Associated with Mr. Kim Chol-song.

• Ministry of External Economic Relations (대외경제성): The North Korean government ministry he belonged to.
• Myong-o Trading Company (명오무역회사, 명오37): A company affiliated with the Kim family's bodyguard unit. He worked with its 2nd Department, which exclusively handled imports for the Kim family.
• Baltika Brewery (발티카): A Russian beer brand that he personally imported into North Korea as a business venture.
• Mansudae Art Studio (만수대창작사): A North Korean art production company. He was involved in rejecting their attempt to establish a branch in Russia to sell paintings, having determined that North Korean artistic styles would fail to gain traction in a country with a deep appreciation and sophisticated taste for fine arts.

Precautions for North Korean Diplomats Operating Abroad

• Avoiding South Korean Internet Services: Diplomats are careful not to use South Korean platforms like Naver or Daum. Because these are South Korean brands, there is a significant risk that South Korean intelligence agencies could track their IP addresses and locations.
• Using Google Instead: When they need to access South Korean news (such as Yonhap News) for research or cross-checking information, they use Google to avoid direct tracking by South Korean platforms.
• Encrypted Communications: Any directives from Kim Jong-un are sent using encrypted messages. This is to prevent foreign intelligence agencies (like those from the US or China) from intercepting the content.
• Secrecy to Prevent Sabotage: Import details are kept strictly secret to ensure that foreign intelligence agencies do not secretly plant tracking chips or listening devices inside the imported cars or electronics.

Souce: [이제 만나러 갑니다] 728회 (2025-12-14)