Testimony

Location of Office 39 (39호실)

According to the information obtained from reliable source by DPRK Monitor, Office 39's location is 39° 0'57.96"N 125°44'24.48"E.

Source: Google Earth Pro

Foreign Currency Earning by Office 39 (39호실)

DPRK Monitor introduces a piece in which South Korean media clearly summarize defector testimony and expert commentary on the activities of Office 39, the bureau responsible for North Korea's foreign currency earnings.

Office 39 manages a diverse range of illicit and exploitative revenue streams:

  • Service & Art: Mansudae Art Studio (만수애창작사, KPe.050) creates high-end artworks, including paintings and intricate embroidery, which are sold for $5,000 to $10,000 each. While a portion of the proceeds is given to the artists, the rest is collected by North Korean restaurants or funneled directly back to the state.
  • Counterfeit Goods: Office 39 oversees the production of counterfeit high-end Dunhill cigarettes, which generate up to $700 million in profit through Chinese and the South East Asian markets. They also attach fraudulent "Made in Korea" labels to North Korean-made clothing to bypass international bias and increase sales.
  • Regarding the sale of one ton of expired butter, the sources describe a specific instance of "creative" foreign currency earning carried out by a North Korean diplomat:
    • Acquisition of Waste (butter): A North Korean ambassador learned of one ton of butter in a foreign country that was nearing or had already passed its expiration date and was scheduled for disposal.
    • Fraudulent Relabeling: Instead of the butter being destroyed, the North Korean embassy acquired it and tampered with the labels to extend the expiration date.
    • Rebranding and Resale: The expired butter was rebranded as premium products from countries like France or Switzerland and then resold in markets across China and Southeast Asia.
    • State Recognition: For successfully generating funds through this illicit scheme, the ambassador was highly praised by the regime and awarded.
  • Labor-Intensive Exports: Following sanctions on minerals, the regime has pivoted to exporting wigs and false eyelashes to China, which became their top export item in early 2024.
  • Arms Dealing: They engage in large-scale weapon smuggling, including missiles and RPGs to the Middle East and the Wagner Group.

Harsh Quotas for Overseas Workers and Diplomats

The regime exerts extreme pressure on its citizens abroad to meet financial targets:

  • Overseas Workers: Approximately 100,000 workers controlled by Office 39 are sent abroad before COVID pandemic.
  • They are often working 12-hour shifts in extreme conditions, such as 50°C heat in the Middle East. The state seizes over 80% of their wages; for example, from a 650,000 KRW ($ 439) monthly salary, 520,000 KWR (351) is taken by the government as "loyalty funds".
  • Diplomats: Modern North Korean diplomats now spend 90% of their time on foreign currency earning rather than traditional diplomacy. They are forced into a "loyalty competition," where success (e.g., earning $1 million) leads to being treated as a "Hero" with a luxury apartment, but failure or getting caught results in recall and potential labor camp sentences.
  • Smuggling Tactics: To transport cash, workers and diplomats hide money in backpacks or inside food containers, such as jars of fermented soybean paste, to avoid detection at customs.

Luxury Spending for the Kim Family

The funds generated by Office 39 support a decadent lifestyle for Kim Jong Un and his family:

  • High-End Fashion: Family members are seen in luxury brands, such as Kim Ju-ae's Dior coat and Ri Sol-ju’s collection of Chanel bags.
  • Collections & Hobbies: According to a former the ROK intelligence service (NIS) expert, Kim Jong Un seems to have childish/infantile tastes and spends approximately $8.5 million (12.7 billion KRW) annually on game machine, model cars and model planes and $6 million (9.3 billion KRW) on high-end bicycles, etc.
  • Palatial Residences & Equipment: The regime maintains about 30 luxury villas (특각); a single renovation of No. 15 residence (15호 관저) in Pyongyang cost roughly $120 million (168 billion KRW). He also owns an 80-meter yacht with a swimming pool and has recently sought to purchase dog sleds from Russia.

Total annual spending on these luxury goods is estimated to be between 600 and 700 billion KRW (approximately $450–$530 million).

Source: 이만갑 608회 (2023-08-27)

Proceeds from artwork sales shared between Mansudae Art Studio and restaurant revenue

According to NIS analysis, Kim Jong Un has childish/juvenile tastes

Residence No. 15, formerly owned by Kim Jong Il.

DM comments: According to ROK media (SBS), Residence No. 15 (39° 0'57.02"N 125°44'45.30"E) — the place where his birth mother once lived, and where he spent his childhood. And Under former President Yoon, South Korea's Drone Command allegedly sent drones targeting Residence No. 15 — Kim Jong Un's residence — in Pyongyang in October 2024.

KJU Owns more than 30 special villas (특각)

Source: Images are from 이만갑 608회 (2023-08-27) (translated by DM)

Inside Kumchang-ri's "Underground Palace": A Defected Colonel's Testimony on North Korea's Secret Nuclear Site (Part 2)

Following Part 1, this section presents the continued testimony of Colonel O Cheol-yong (오철용).

  • He also testified about the harrowing labor conditions at nuclear facilities (Such testimony has also been referenced in past defector memoirs).
  • Also appearing on the program was Ryu Hyun-woo (류현우), North Korea's former chargé d'affaires (acting ambassador) to Kuwait, who defected in 2019. He identified a location where nuclear physicists from Russia and other former Soviet states reportedly resided in an apartment near his home for several years following the collapse of the Soviet Union (39°2'4.11"N 125°47'55.61"E).
  • In addition, Puhung Trading (부흥무역) is a trading company operated to secure funding sources for 131st Bureau.

Brutal Working Conditions and Human Casualties (Statements by Colonel O Cheol-yong)

  • At nuclear development sites, hazardous work is carried out with inadequate protective equipment, resulting in serious health damage.

  • Deplorable mining conditions: At uranium mines, work is conducted at depths of 2,000 to 4,000 meters underground, with workers wearing only masks and helmets and no protective suits.

  • Radioactive contamination and the "50-year-old hwangap": Soldiers working at nuclear facilities such as Yongbyon age so severely that they lose their teeth and go gray-haired in their forties. Because of this, there is a tragic local custom of celebrating the hwangap (還暦, the traditional 60th-birthday milestone) at age 50 instead of the usual age 60.

  • Desperate concealment operations: Ahead of an inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), there is an account of roughly 100 workers, without protective suits, manually removing highly radioactive (liquid) waste using buckets. It is reported that everyone involved in this operation died within ten years.

Recruitment of Nuclear Experts from former USSR (Statements by Ambassador Ryu)

  • After the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, North Korea appears to have housed senior nuclear physicists from Russia and Ukraine in an apartment near Pyongyang for several years.

The Reality of Puhung Trading (부흥무역) (Statements by Ryu)

Puhung Trading (부흥무역) is a trading company operated to secure funding sources for 131st Bureau. Working for this company carried significant advantages: while military service in North Korea typically lasts many years, employees who served three years at Puhung Trading were granted admission to the Workers' Party of Korea, making it a popular posting for the children of senior officials.

DM's Supplementary Notes on Puhung Trading


Apartment of Former Soviet Nuclear Physicists

Source: Google Earth Pro (annotated by DM)

DPRK Monitor provides an additional explanation of Kumchang-ri's UGF.

40° 7'5.68"N 125° 7'58.63"E

Source: Google Earth Pro (annotated by DM)

Based on information of the ISIS’s Solving the North Korean Nuclear Puzzle‍ ‍and Arms Control Wonk, the UGF layout appears to be as described above. The facility features an intersecting grid of four north-south tunnels and 17 east-west tunnels. While satellite imagery shows structures that seem to connect to the underground facility, DPRK Monitor has not confirmed whether these are the actual entrances and exits to the UGF.

Source: Google Earth Pro (annotated by DM)

Inside Kumchang-ri's "Underground Palace": A Defected Colonel's Testimony on North Korea's Secret Nuclear Site (Part 1)

Introduction

  • DPRK Monitor (DM) introduces the testimony given to South Korean media "Channel A (채널A)" by Colonel O Cheol-yong (오철용), who defected in 2020. He worked at the 131st Bureau (131 지도국), which handles uranium mining, the construction of nuclear-related facilities, support for the technicians and military units engaged in these tasks, and foreign currency earning activities.
  • An interesting point in Colonel O's testimony is that the Kumchang-ri (금창리) underground facility was built specifically for nuclear use. It was constructed over approximately 10 years starting from the early 1990s, mobilizing about 10,000 personnel. The interior is reportedly so massive that it is referred to as an "Underground Palace" (The size of the facility is also noted in David Albright’s book, Solving the North Korean Nuclear Puzzle).
  • Additionally, Colonel O testified about how information regarding the facility leaked to South Korea and the United States. A female military official, who had no authority to visit, toured the Kumchang-ri underground facility and spoke about its existence to an acquaintance who was the president of a trading company affiliated to 131st Bureau.
  • Colonel O also worked for six months at Pyongsan, a North Korean uranium mine. He testified about uranium mine production and the poor working conditions in 1992, when soldiers went to Yongbyon to process radioactive waste during the IAEA inspections.
  • DM notes that the Kumchang-ri underground facility was suspected of being a nuclear-related facility in 1999, leading to allegations that North Korea had violated the Agreed Framework (signed between the U.S. and North Korea in 1994). Although a U.S. delegation visited the site, no definitive proof was found that it was a nuclear facility.
  • DM believes that the testimony from someone belonging to a unit deeply involved in the construction of such facilities—confirming that the Kumchang-ri facility was indeed a nuclear-related facility as originally suspected—is extremely important. Since the content is extensive, it will be introduced in two parts.

David Albright’s book, Solving the North Korean Nuclear Puzzle (page. 173) puts it as folllows:

The nine kilometers of tunnels were laid out in a grid-like pattern, with 17 longer tunnels crossed by four shorter ones, with entrances on each end. The proportions of the tunnels were approximately 40 meters wide by six meters high. Almost all of the tunnels were composed of bare rock, and it was evident that the site took at least a decade to excavate.

Roles of the 131st Bureau (131 지도국)

The 131st Bureau is one of the units in which Kim Jong Un places the most trust; it was named after its founding date, January 31st. Its main roles are as follows:

  • Management of the entire nuclear development process: It handles everything from uranium mining and transport to the establishment of production processes and the construction and management of nuclear facilities.
  • Monopoly on specialized technology: The unit possesses its own technical teams necessary for nuclear development and is responsible for all practical nuclear-related matters, including uranium refining, the setting up of nuclear test sites, and the management of nuclear facilities.
  • The Supreme Leader's "Praetorian Guard" (친위대): The bureau plays such a central role in nuclear development that the late General Secretary Kim Jong Il once stated, "Nuclear weapons are the Supreme Commander myself, and the 131st Bureau is my Praetorian Guard (친위대)".

The Reality of the Kumchang-ri Facility

The Kumchang-ri facility caused great suspicion in the international community in the late 1990s, and its internal reality was that of a large-scale underground nuclear facility.

  • Camouflage and Suspicion: On August 17, 1998, reporter David Sanger of the New York Times, known for many excellent reports on these issues, brought the suspicion to light by reporting "NORTH KOREA SITE AN A-BOMB PLANT, U.S. AGENCIES SAY." The North Korean side claimed it was a "rice warehouse" and extracted a large amount of food aid from the US in exchange for an on-site access.
  • Scale of Construction: It took about 10 years to build, starting from the early 1990s, with approximately 10,000 personnel mobilized. The interior is so vast it is called an "Underground Palace".
  • Information Leak and Crackdown: Although the facility's secrets were strictly kept, information leaked after a female director of a "Gunsang" (군상, a store for military personnel) under the 131st Bureau witnessed the interior while accompanying a political officer. She apparently spoke about the contents to the president of a trading company who had suggested she see the underground facility, which was then discovered by North Korean authorities. The North Korean authorities' assessment was that the information had leaked to the South Korean Agency for National Security Planning (안기부, now the National Intelligence Service) and the US.
  • Abandonment of the Facility: Because the information leaked just before its completion as a nuclear facility, the North Korean side was forced to suddenly abandon the use of the facility.

Source: [이제 만나러 갑니다] 746회 (2026‑04-26)

Colonel O Cheol-yong
Source: Channel A

Image of Kumchang-ri underground facility visited by a female director of a "Gunsang"

Source: Channel A

Beyond the Sanctions: Long-Time Diplomat and Personal Luxury Car Buyer for Kim Jong Un Defects

Summary

The Sourth Korea media "Channel A (채널A)" introduces the defection story and current activities in South Korea of Kim Chol-song, a former North Korean diplomat who was tasked with importing Kim Jong-un's exclusive luxury cars. While serving as the Deputy Representative for Economic Affairs in St. Petersburg, Russia, he realized the imminent threat of North Korea's guilt-by-association system—even for the elite—after his relative was punished for distributing Bibles. To protect the future and freedom of his then 11-year-old son, he fully utilized his diplomatic privileges and personal connections to successfully seek asylum in South Korea with his family in an exceptionally fast timeframe of just two days. Currently in South Korea, he is dedicating his efforts to improving North Korean human rights issues and rescuing North Korean soldiers mobilized in the Russia-Ukraine war.

Profile and Activities of the Guest

  • Name: Mr. Kim Chol-song (김철성)
  • Period: He was stationed abroad from 2007 to 2016.
  • Location: St. Petersburg, Russia.
  • Activities:
    • He served as the Deputy Representative of the Economic and Trade Counselor's Office in St. Petersburg, representing the North Korean Ministry of External Economic Relations.
    • He managed North Korean foreign currency-earning enterprises and construction workers dispatched to Russia, and held the authority to approve or deny North Korean businesses trying to enter the Russian market.
    • He acted as a highly trusted "personal shopper" for Kim Jong-un, directly importing luxury foreign vehicles (like Mercedes-Benz) and personal items exclusively for the Kim family.
    • On a personal business level, he imported Russian Baltika beer into North Korea to meet his foreign currency-earning quotas.

Items Transported to North Korea and Smuggling Methods

  • Items Transported: He imported a total of nine luxury vehicles, including Mercedes-Benz cars, and buses for Kim Jong-un and his bodyguards. He also transported small daily necessities, such as soap boxes and combs used by the Kim family.
  • Methods:
    • Using Foreign Intermediaries: Because of international sanctions, he could not purchase these items legally. He used foreign nationals (from China, Singapore, the Netherlands, etc.) and their bank accounts to buy the cars and transfer funds.
    • Route Laundering: To avoid tracking, the cars were repeatedly bought and sold among foreigners and moved through multiple countries, acting like money laundering. For example, a car might go from the Netherlands to the UK, Singapore, Macau, Japan, Busan (South Korea), and finally Vladivostok (Russia).
    • Delivery into North Korea: From Vladivostok, the vehicles were airlifted directly to Pyongyang using transport planes. Alternatively, vehicles were driven to Dandong, China, where North Korean guards would take over and drive them into North Korea using "Route 123," an exclusive road for the Kim family.
    • Evading Inspections: To ensure utmost secrecy, smaller personal items for the Kim family were handed over in person in places like Dandong, specifically avoiding any X-ray security checks.

Companies Associated with Mr. Kim Chol-song.

  • Ministry of External Economic Relations (대외경제성): The North Korean government ministry he belonged to.
  • Myong-o Trading Company (명오무역회사, 명오37): A company affiliated with the Kim family's bodyguard unit. He worked with its 2nd Department, which exclusively handled imports for the Kim family.
  • Baltika Brewery (발티카): A Russian beer brand that he personally imported into North Korea as a business venture.
  • Mansudae Art Studio (만수대창작사): A North Korean art production company. He was involved in rejecting their attempt to establish a branch in Russia to sell paintings, having determined that North Korean artistic styles would fail to gain traction in a country with a deep appreciation and sophisticated taste for fine arts.

Precautions for North Korean Diplomats Operating Abroad

  • Avoiding South Korean Internet Services: Diplomats are careful not to use South Korean platforms like Naver or Daum. Because these are South Korean brands, there is a significant risk that South Korean intelligence agencies could track their IP addresses and locations.
  • Using Google Instead: When they need to access South Korean news (such as Yonhap News) for research or cross-checking information, they use Google to avoid direct tracking by South Korean platforms.
  • Encrypted Communications: Any directives from Kim Jong-un are sent using encrypted messages. This is to prevent foreign intelligence agencies (like those from the US or China) from intercepting the content.
  • Secrecy to Prevent Sabotage: Import details are kept strictly secret to ensure that foreign intelligence agencies do not secretly plant tracking chips or listening devices inside the imported cars or electronics.

Souce: [이제 만나러 갑니다] 728회 (2025-12-14)

Mr. Kim Chol-song

Myong-o Trading Company structure

January 25, 2026

RFA Resumes Broadcasts to North Korea (Reuters)

  • Significant Resumption 
    The resumption of broadcasts to North Korea is of great importance, following their suspension in 2025 due to a decision by the Trump administration.

  • Strategic Importance
    Regarding the critical role RFA plays in broadcasting to North Korea, DPRK Monitor highlights an article from The Diplomat titled, "Why Strengthening RFA Is a Strategic Imperative for US Policy on North Korea."

  • A Powerful Perspective:
    This article was authored by Eunsook Jang, a Fulbright Scholar and North Korean defector. It delivers a deeply persuasive and powerful message regarding the profound impact that the influx of foreign information has on the citizens of North Korea. An overview of the article is provided below.

Summary of Eunsook Jang, The Diplomat, "Why Strengthening RFA Is a Strategic Imperative for US Policy on North Korea"

The recent suspension of Radio Free Asia (RFA) news operations is a significant strategic error for U.S. foreign policy regarding North Korea. 

Following a March 2025 executive order that restricted the organization, RFA was forced to halt operations in November 2025 for the first time in nearly three decades. 

The author, a North Korean defector, emphasizes that independent information serves as a powerful, non-coercive tool that dismantles state indoctrination, empowers the "Jangmadang Generation," and challenges the Kim regime’s ideological monopoly. 

Strengthening RFA is framed as an essential move for U.S. security interests and long-term regional stability.

Eunsook Jang’s Personal Transformation

  • Shattering 14 Years of Indoctrination: After growing up for 14 years consuming nothing but state propaganda, Jang’s entire worldview was dismantled by watching a single Indian movie.

  • Discovery of an "Unimaginable" Reality: In the film, she witnessed a lawyer fighting to defend a citizen against the state; this was a concept she found completely "unimaginable" because, in North Korea, legal defenders exist only to legitimize the regime's decisions.

  • The Catalyst for Defection: These brief, accumulated insights into human dignity and justice eventually gave her the clarity and resolve to escape the country at the age of 14.

January 24, 2026

Book Review (Part 1) The Kim Jong Un I Saw 私が見た金正恩

North Korean Diplomat (from Chapter 4)

  • At my father’s strong encouragement, I entered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1999. After undergoing approximately one month of background checks, on August 27 the Ministry’s Senior Officials Bureau (Personnel Division) assigned me as a trainee to the Computer Materials Office of Section 2 of the External Communications Management Bureau.


  • The External Communications Management Bureau was the department specializing in wireless and other communications between the North Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its embassies stationed overseas. At the time I joined the Ministry, it was developing new radio equipment in order to prevent interception by Western intelligence agencies such as those of the United States.


  • Because this required enormous funding and advanced technical expertise, a new Section 2 was established, composed of a radio equipment design and production team that included seven top-tier graduates of Kim Chaek University of Technology, university professors, and other specialists. Section 2 was organized into a Technical Unit and a Computer Materials Office.


  • The Technical Unit consisted of the operational personnel responsible for manufacturing radio equipment. Externally known as “DAKO” (an abbreviation of Data Korea), the Computer Materials Office functioned as a foreign-currency-earning team. DAKO’s task was to digitize all paper documents held by international organizations in Switzerland into electronic files and receive payment for that work.


  • This operation was initiated by Ri Su-yong [also known as Ri Chol], who was then serving as North Korea’s ambassador to Geneva. The External Communications Management Bureau used the funds earned in this way to purchase materials and components required for radio equipment production from China and other countries.


  • One day, after spending more than two years as a trainee within the Communications Management Bureau, an opportunity came my way. I was formally appointed as a Grade-2 staff member in the Radio Section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Situation Materials and Translation Bureau. My duties involved listening to broadcasts from Voice of America (VOA), Japan’s NHK, Radio Russia, China Radio International, and others, summarizing their content, and distributing written reports to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the First Vice Minister, the Vice Ministers, and other senior officials.


  • The documents distributed by the Radio Section were titled Radio Report and Special Bulletin. Radio Report mainly covered reactions from the international community—such as the United States and Japan—related to the North Korean nuclear issue. Special Bulletin handled, under strict secrecy, articles concerning Kim Jong-il and his family. It was at that time that I first heard the names of Kim Jong-il’s eldest son, Kim Jong-nam, and Kim Jong-un’s mother, Ko Yong-hui.


  • Among the many radio channels available, Kim Jong-il and other senior North Korean officials trusted NHK the most. This was because NHK’s reporting was perceived as faster than others and objective. Kim Jong-il made several non-public visits to China, and on each occasion NHK reported from the very moment the special train crossed the Yalu River bridge into China. That was truly mysterious.

(Translated by DPRK Monitor)

January 19, 2026

Book Introduction: From Havana to Seoul: The Secret Records of a Defector

The Kim Jong Un I Saw

私が見た金正恩

Overview

DPRK Monitor presents insights from the memoir The Kim Jong Un I Saw (Sankei Shimbun Publications), written by Ri (Lee) Il-gyu (리일규 李日奎), a former North Korean diplomat who defected from the embassy in Cuba in 2023. We will share interesting excerpts from this book, organized by section.

Table of Contents

  • Chapter 1: Defection Called Forth by Anger

  • Chapter 2: My Father's Downfall

  • Chapter 3: Escape from Hardship

  • Chapter 4: North Korean Diplomat

  • Chapter 5: Life in the Cuban Public Mission (Embassy)

  • Chapter 6: The "Chong Chon Gang" Incident

  • Chapter 7: The Kim Jong Un I Saw

  • Chapter 8: Secret Records of North Korea

Key Background

Source: Amazon.