
We are vigilant about DPRK activities.
This is a non-exhaustive list of reports from several sources.
We are always updating…
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<Arms Control Wonk> 2025-6-10, A New Enrichment Plant At Yongbyon?
War in Ukraine
<Telegram> 2025-6-17, Kovalenko (KN-23)
<Telegram> 2025-4-24, Special Operation Forces (DPRK platoon in close combat)
<Telegram> 2025-4-16, Kovalenko (KN-23)
<Telegram> 2025-4-16, Kovalenko (Russia imports DPRK labors)
<Telegram> 2025-4-15, Kovalenko (Ammunition)
<Telegram> 2025-1-27, Special Operation Forces (Seized DPRK troops equipments)
<Telegram> 2025-1-25, Kovalenko (M-1978 Koksan)
<X> 2025-1-11, Volodymyr Zelenskyy (Two DPRK soldiers captured in the Kursk Region), https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1878046090018042169
<Telegram> 2025-1-8, Special Operation Forces (DPRK soldiers captured in the Kursk Region)
<Telegram> 2025-1-8, Special Operation Forces (DPRK soldier’s memo)
<Telegram> 2025-1-7, Special Operation Forces (DPRK 13 soldiers were killed)
<Telegram> 2025-1-3, Kovalenko (Soldiers’ notebook)
<HP, Ukraine Defense Intelligence> 2025-1-2 (Russians continued to involve units of the DPRK army in conducting hostilities in the Kursk region)
<Telegram> 2024-12-28, Special Operation Forces (Soldier’s memo)
<Telegram> 2024-12-26, Special Operation Forces (Soldier’s memo, How to eliminate a drone)
<Telegram> 2024-12-23, Kovalenko (Soldiers’s death)
<X> 2024-12-23, Volodymyr Zelenskyy (More than 3000 DPRK soldiers were killed and wounded), https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1871216838585016699
<Telegram> 2024-12-22, Armed Forces of Ukraine (Disguised ID of DPRK soldiers)
<Facebook> 2024-12-20, Air Force Command of UA Armed Forces (KN-23 attacks against Kyiv)
<Telegram> 2024-12-17, Kovalenko (Soldiers wounded)
<Telegram> 2024-12-17, Kovalenko (Reactions to drones)
<Facebook> 2024-12-17, Ukraine Defense Intelligence (DPRK deployed surveillance posts of drones)
<Telegram> 2024-12-16, Kovalenko (Drone footage)
<Telegram> 2024-12-15, Kovalenko (Drone footage)
<Telegram> 2024-12-14, Kovalenko (Dressed in Russian uniforms)
<Telegram> 2024-11-29, Kovalenko (KN-23, Artillery)
<Facebook> 2024-11-26, Ukraine Defense Intelligence (Foreign components from KN-23/KN-24)
Reference materials, War Sanctions webpage, https://war-sanctions.gur.gov.ua/en/components
<Telegram> 2024-11-24, Kovalenko (KN-23)
<Telegram> 2024-11-24, Kovalenko (Disguised as Russians)
<Telegram> 2024-11-23, Kovalenko (Oil transfer)
<Telegram> 2024-11-22, Kovalenko (Transfer of soldiers)
<Telegram> 2024-11-20, Kovalenko (13th GRAU stored KN-23)
<Telegram> 2024-11-19, Kovalenko (67th GRSU stored DPRK munitions)
<Telegram> 2024-11-16, Kovalenko (“DPRK don’t believe God”)
<Telegram> 2024-11-15, Kovalenko (UAV)
<Telegram> 2024-11-13, Kovalenko KN-23)
<Facebook> 2024-11-10, Ukraine Defense Intelligence (Intercepted DPRK troops radio)
<Telegram> 2024-11-8, Kovalenko (DPRK soldiers in Kursk)
<Telegram> 2024-11-7, Kovalenko (DPRK soldiers in Kursk)
<Telegram> 2024-11-5, Kovalenko (DPRK soldiers, Drone training)
<Telegram> 2024-11-4, Kovalenko (The first DPRK troops under fire )
<Facebook> 2024-11-2, Ukraine Defense Intelligence (More than 7000 DPRK soldiers moved from Primorsky Krai to areas near Ukraine)
<Telegram> 2024-10-31, Kovalenko (3000 DPRK soldiers in Kursk Region)
<Facebook> 2024-10-27, Ukraine Defense Intelligence (Transporting DPRK mercenaries to the front in trucks with civilian plates)
<Facebook> 2024-10-24, Ukraine Defense Intelligence (The first DPRK troops arrived in the combat zone)
<Telegram> 2024-10-23, Kovalenko (DPRK troops arrival in Primorsky Krai)
<Telegram> 2024-10-15, Kovalenko (Less 1% DPRK officers speak Russian)
<Telegram> 2024-10-15, Kovalenko (DPRK troops may be in Kursk Region)
<Telegram> 2024-10-14, Kovalenko (Fiction of 100,000 units preparation)
<Telegram> 2024-10-9, Kovalenko (DPRK ammo stored at 67 GRAU)
<Telegram> 2024-10-8, Kovalenko (DPRK engineers were deployed)
<Telegram> 2024-9-29, Kovalenko (Attempt to blow up railway)
<Telegram> 2024-9-3, Kovalenko (DPRK ballistic missile)
<Telegram> 2024-8-6, Kovalenko (DPRK ballistic missile)
<Telegram> 2024-8-2, Kovalenko (DPRK mortars delivery)
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<38 North> 2025-8-7, Quick Take: Yongbyon’s 5 MWe Reactor Undergoes a Makeover.
<38 North> 2025-6-13, Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center: A Suspected New Enrichment Facility and Dismantlement of 50 MWe Reactor
<CSIS> 2025-6-12, Suspected Uranium Enrichment Building at Yongbyon
<ISIS> 2025-6-11, Is North Korea Building a New, Kangsong-Like Building at Yongbyon?
<Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey> 2025-6-10, Suspect Enrichment Facility in the DPRK
<CSIS> 2025-5-8, Yongdok-tong Nuclear High Explosives Test Facility: Part 3
<CSIS> 2025-5-2, Yongdok-tong Nuclear High Explosive Test Facility: Part 2
<CSIS> 2025-4-22, Yongdok-tong Nuclear High Explosive Test Facility: Part 1
<Open Source Centre> 2025-4-15, Brothers in Arms: Estimating North Korean Munitions Deliveries to Russia
<Open Source Centre> 2025-2-18, Red Passage: Russian-DPRK Munition Carrier Seeks to Transit the Suez
<Open Source Centre> 2024-11-22, Refined Tastes: Russian Oil Deliveries to Pyongyang Breach the Million Barrel Mark
<Conflict Armament Research> 2024 September, North Korean missiles produced in 2024 used in Ukraine
<Conflict Armament Research> 2024 February, North Korean missile relies on recent electronic components
<Conflict Armament Research> 2024 January, Documenting a North Korean missile in Ukraine
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<Radio Free Asia> 2023-9-20, 당국 외면 속 죽어가는 해외 북 노동자 (Overseas North Korean Workers Dying Amid Government Neglect).
<BBC> 2025-8-12, North Koreans tell BBC they are being sent to work 'like slaves' in Russia.
<Korea JoongAng Daily> 2025-7-18, UN's North Korean sanction-monitoring team shares evidence of Pyongyang-Moscow military cooperation.
<CNN> 2025-7-2, North Korea to send as many as 30,000 troops to bolster Russia’s forces, Ukrainian officials say.
<CBS> 2025-5-2, How a routine hire at a Houston tech firm uncovered an alleged North Korea scheme
<Jiji> 2025-4-7, 2 Japanese Men Suspected of Helping N. Korean IT Worker
War in Ukraine
<MBC> 2025-06-26, 국회 정보위원회 백브리핑 (Background briefing by the National Assembly Intelligence Committee of the ROK).
<Комсомольская Правда>2025-06-17,Шойгу сообщил, что КНДР направит 5000 строителей на восстановление Курской области (Shoigu stated that the DPRK will send 5,000 construction workers to help with the reconstruction of the Kursk region.)
<ТАСС> 2025-6-17, КНДР направит 5 тыс. строителей на восстановление Курской области (The DPRK will send 5,000 construction workers to help with the reconstruction of the Kursk region.)
<Yonhap News Agency> 2024-10-29, [속보] 국정원 北폭풍군단 파병으로 알려져…입대연령 낮아 (National Intelligence Service Known to Deploy North Korean Storm Corps)
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<US Department of Treasury> 2025-7-24, Treasury Sanctions Clandestine IT Worker Network Funding the DPRK’s Weapons Programs.
<Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team> 2025-7-18, MSMT Briefs UN Member States on its First Report (July 17, New York).
<US Department of State> 2025-7-17, MSMT Report on Unlawful North Korea-Russia Military Cooperation.
<Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team> 2025-5-29, Unlawful Military Cooperation including Arms Transfers between North Korea and Russia
<United States Mission to the United Nations> 2025-5-20, Remarks at the General Assembly High-Level Meeting on Human Rights in the DPRK
<US Justice Department> 2025-1-23, Two North Korean Nationals and Three Facilitators Indicted for Multi-Year Fraudulent Remote Information Technology Worker Scheme that Generated Revenue for the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (IT Worker)
<US Justice Department> 2024-12-12, Fourteen North Korean Nationals Indicted for Carrying Out Multi-Year Fraudulent Information Technology Worker Scheme and Related Extortions (IT Worker)
<Republic of Korea, National Intelligence Service> 2024-10-18, 국정원, 북한 특수부대 러-우크라 전쟁 참전 확인 (NIS confirms participation of North Korean special forces in Russia-Ukraine war)
<US Justice Department> 2024-8-8, Justice Department Disrupts North Korean Remote IT Worker Fraud Schemes Through Charges and Arrest of Nashville Facilitator (IT Worker)
<UK, Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation> 2024-9-12, Advisory on North Korean IT Workers.
<US, Defense Intelligence Agency> 2024-5-29, North Korea Enabling Russian Missile Strikes Against Ukraine
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Non-proliferation
<United Nations Security Council> 2025-5-7, Non-proliferation/Democratic People's Republic of Korea (James Byrne, Chief Executive Officer and Founder of Open Source Centre, presented DPRK’s illegal coal and iron ore exports.) UN Web TV
<United Nations Security Council> 2024-12-18, Non-proliferation/Democratic People's Republic of Korea (Jonah Leff, Director of Operations for Conflict Armament Research (CAR), presented CAR’s additional findings after examining the remnants of a missile recovered in Ukraine.) UN Web TV
<United Nations Security Council> 2024-6-28, Non-proliferation/Democratic People's Republic of Korea (Jonah Leff, Director of Operations for Conflict Armament Research (CAR), presented CAR’s findings after examining the remnants of a missile recovered in Ukraine.) UN Web TV
<IAEA> 2025-8-18, Application of Safeguards in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea Report by the Director General.
<IAEA> 2025-3-3, IAEA Director General's Introductory Statement to the Board of Governors
<IAEA> 2024-11-20, IAEA Director General's Introductory Statement to the Board of Governors
<IAEA> 2024-9-9, IAEA Director General's Introductory Statement to the Board of Governors
<IAEA> 2024-8-26, Application of Safeguards in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
<IAEA> 2024-6-3, IAEA Director General's Introductory Statement to the Board of Governors
<IAEA> 2024-3-4, IAEA Director General's Introductory Statement to the Board of Governors
Human rights abuse
<United Nations> 2025-5-20, Human Rights Abuses and Violations in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea - High-level plenary, General Assembly, 79th session
Topics
Spotlight
Catch Up on the Latest Highlights!
August 21, 2025
IAEA Director General’s Report on DPRK: Plutonium production continues, Uranium enrichment points to expanding capacity
Uranium Mining and Milling (Pyongsan)
Continued indications of mining, milling, and concentrate production activities were observed at the Pyongsan uranium mine and concentrate plant, consistent with prior years.
Conversion and Fuel Fabrication
Renovation of the UF₄ Production Process Building was completed and the facility appeared operational by October 2024. Ongoing activities were also observed in other buildings, including four newly constructed facilities — two of which are secured within a common perimeter — that exhibit features consistent with chemical processing.Uranium Enrichment (Kangson and Yongbyon)
The Kangson complex was confirmed to contain cascades of gas centrifuges — twelve cascades, each consisting of 344 centrifuges — consistent with the production of LEU, although the possibility of HEU production elsewhere at the site cannot be excluded.
At Yongbyon, the enrichment facility was confirmed to have expanded cascades in its original hall (Hall 1, six cascades), the 2013 extension (Hall 2, eight cascades), and the 2021–2022 annex (six cascades). The cascades, each of 344 centrifuges, remain configured for LEU production, and the facility continued operations during the reporting period. Centrifuges at both Kangson and Yongbyon appeared of the same type, with no indication of advanced centrifuge installation.In December 2024, satellite imagery showed the start of construction on a new two-storey building southwest of the 50MW(e) reactor at Yongbyon. By May 2025 the structure was externally complete, though work on surrounding support facilities was still ongoing. The building’s layout and dimensions closely resemble those of the Kangson enrichment facility, suggesting a similar potential function.
Reactors (Graphite-moderated and Light Water Reactor):
The 5MW(e) Experimental Reactor at Yongbyon continued operations, with a shutdown of about 60 days between August and October 2024 sufficient to allow refueling, indicating the start of a seventh operational cycle.
The LWR was shut down in September and October 2024, and again for much of April 2025, with brief additional shutdowns occurring intermittently thereafter.Reprocessing (Radiochemical Laboratory):
The steam plant serving only the Radiochemical Laboratory became fully operational by late January 2025 and has since run almost continuously, consistent with reprocessing of irradiated fuel from the 5MW(e) reactor’s sixth operational cycle. Additional waste management infrastructure was installed near the facility.Nuclear-powered Submarine:
In March 2025, the DPRK showcased the construction of a “nuclear-powered strategic guided missile submarine” at a shipyard in Sinpho. While imagery confirms a submarine hull under construction, the Agency is unable to verify whether a reactor has been developed or installed.Weaponization and Nuclear Testing (Punggye-ri):
The Punggye-ri nuclear test site remains in a state of readiness to support a nuclear test, though no significant new activity was observed during the reporting period.
Source: IAEA.
August 17, 2025
Radio Free Asia’s 2023 exposé reveals the brutal exploitation of North Korean workers abroad, exposing blatant violations of UN sanctions in Russia.
<Radio Free Asia> 2023-9-20, 당국 외면 속 죽어가는 해외 북 노동자 (Overseas North Korean Workers Dying Amid Government Neglect).
<Summary>
Internal documents from a North Korean construction company operating in Russia, recently obtained by RFA, reveal that during the COVID-19 pandemic, workers who fell ill were denied proper medical care and, with the borders closed, were effectively abandoned in Russia, unable to return home.
Excessive Hours: Workers were forced into grueling construction work, often over 16 hours per day including night shifts.
Lack of Medical Access:
Many workers with serious illnesses (cancer, emphysema, heart disease) were denied hospital care due to high costs.
In extreme cases, workers even pulled out their own teeth because they could not go to hospitals.
Financial Exploitation:
After state deductions, workers kept only $100 a month on average, making it impossible to afford medical bills of $5,000–6,000+.
Neglect by Authorities:
North Korean authorities provided no medical or financial support, especially during the COVID-19 border closures, leaving workers effectively abandoned abroad.
One of the internal documents showing examples of North Korean vernacular
Source: DPRK Panel of Experts repot, S/2024/215, p. 431.
August 14, 2025
<BBC> North Koreans Sent to Russia to Work "Like Slaves"
<Summary>
Russia is importing tens of thousands of North Korean laborers to cover war-induced labor shortages-over 10,000 in 2024 and potentially over 50,000 in 2025.
The BBC interviewed six escapees who described:
18-hour workdays, seven days a week.
Hazardous work conditions, often without adequate safety equipment or medical care.
Constant surveillance by North Korean security agent, with workers confined to sites.
Squalid living quarters, including bug-infested shipping containers and unfinished buildings.
Physical abuse when workers fall asleep due to exhaustion.
Most wages are collected by the regime; workers get only a small monthly amount after returning home.
These practices violate UN sanctions and constitute forced labor, reflecting widespread state exploitation.
Source: BBC (Edited by DPRK Monitor).
DPRK Monitor exposes more cases of North Korean worker exploitation in Russia (See above article by Radio Free Asia in 2023).
Source: BBC.
Useful link on DPRK human rights violations
August 8, 2025
Old Game, New Name: Sobaeksu and DPRK’s WMD Legacy
The US government has recently designated the Korea Sobaeksu Trading Company (Sobaeksu) for asset freezing, citing its involvement in foreign currency-generating activities conducted by DPRK IT workers.
However, by examining past DPRK Panel reports, it becomes clear that Sobaeksu is in fact connected to companies previously involved in WMD development—namely, NAMCHONGANG TRADING CORPORATION (NCG) and KOREA MINING DEVELOPMENT TRADING CORPORATION (KOMID).
Diagram of Links Between Kim Se Un, Sobaeksu, and DPRK WMD programme
Source: Maltego Graph Visualization by DPRK Monitor.
July 24, 2025
U.S. Treasury Sanctions North Korean Front Company and Individuals for Sanctions Evasion and Revenue Generation
<Summary>
The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned the Korea Sobaeksu Trading Company (also known as Sobaeksu United Corporation) and three North Korean individuals—Kim Se Un, Jo Kyong Hun, and Myong Chol Min—for their roles in evading U.S. and UN sanctions and clandestinely generating revenue for the DPRK government.
Key points:
Sobaeksu acts as a front company for the DPRK’s Munitions Industry Department, involved in nuclear and missile development. It sends IT workers overseas (e.g., to Vietnam) and conducts nuclear procurement.
Kim Se Un is a key operator using foreign-based companies to hire North Korean IT workers abroad. A reward of up to $3 million is offered for information leading to his arrest/conviction.
Jo Kyong Hun, based in North Korea, leads Sobaeksu’s IT team and collaborates with Kim on cryptocurrency and financial schemes to support IT operations.
Myong Chol Min, a trade representative, helps facilitate business deals to evade sanctions and import goods (like tobacco) into North Korea. He is also subject to a $3 million reward offer.
July 20, 2025
Source: The MSMT.
MSMT Unveils Evidence of Sanctions‑Violating DPRK–Russia Military Ties at UN Briefing
<Summary>
On July 17, 2025, the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team (MSMT) held a formal briefing at the United Nations Headquarters in New York to present its first report, titled “Unlawful North Korea–Russia Military Cooperation.” (The report released on May 29, 2025 is available in English, Spanish, French, Russian, Chinese, and Arabic)
The session was attended by representatives from the 11 MSMT member states—Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, the United Kingdom, and the United States—as well as delegates from over 40 other UN member countries.
The MSMT was established in October 2024 as a successor to the UN Security Council’s Panel of Experts under the 1718 Sanctions Committee, which was disbanded following a Russian veto. Its mandate is to monitor and report on violations and evasions of UN sanctions on DPRK.
According to the US Department of State website, “the MSMT welcomes interest from additional states to participate in the mechanism.”
July 2, 2025
<CNN> 2025-7-2, North Korea sending up to 30k more troops to fight for Russia.
North Korea to send as many as 30,000 troops to bolster Russia’s forces, Ukrainian officials say.
<Summary>
North Korea is reportedly preparing to send 25,000 to 30,000 additional troops to Russia, according to Ukrainian intelligence and corroborated by Western sources.
Around 11,000 North Korean soldiers were secretly deployed to Russia in late 2024. About 4,000 of them were killed or injured in combat, particularly during the defense of Russia’s Kursk region.
Ukrainian assessment states the Russian Ministry of Defense will supply equipment and arms, with the goal of integrating North Korean troops into Russian combat units, including potential involvement in large-scale offensive operations.
Satellite imagery shows troop transport ships and IL-76 cargo planes at Russian and North Korean ports and airports, suggesting preparations for further deployments.
Ukrainian officials and analysts suggest Pyongyang aims to deepen its "blood debt" with Moscow to gain long-term leverage, despite high short-term losses.
(Edited by DPRK Monitor)
June 26, 2025
<MBC> 2025-06-26, 국회 정보위원회 백브리핑 (Background briefing by the National Assembly Intelligence Committee of the ROK).
ROK National Intelligence Service (NIS) Assessment of DPRK-Russia Military Cooperation
Russia may launch a major offensive in July or August.
In October 2023, North Korea deployed 11,000 personnel to Russia, followed by an additional 4,000 troops.
Russia recently announced the deployment of 6,000 military engineers and construction units for reconstruction in Kursk.
NIS believes further deployments could occur as early as July or August, citing past patterns and ongoing recruitment efforts in North Korea.
Russia is believed to have provided economic aid, air defense systems, and electronic warfare equipment, along with technical support for space launch engines, drones, and missile guidance systems.
(Edited by DPRK Monitor)
June 17, 2025
<Комсомольская Правда> 2025-06-17, Шойгу сообщил, что КНДР направит 5000 строителей на восстановление Курской области
Shoigu stated that the DPRK will send 5,000 construction workers to help with the reconstruction of the Kursk region.
May 20, 2025
Source: UN Web TV
“The DPRK’s unlawful nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles programs is inextricably linked to the regime’s human rights abuses as the programs are financed through the forced labor of North Korean citizens, at home and abroad.”